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Asset Building and Property Owning 
Democracy: Singapore Housing Policy
as a Model of Social Investment
and Social Justice
James Lee
Hong	Kong	Polytechnic	University
This	 paper	 discusses	 a	 fundamental	 issue	 that	 continues	 to	 haunt	
Western	welfare	states:	despite	rising	levels	of	social	expenditures	and	
a	rigorous	social	investment-oriented	social	policy,	poverty	and	acute	
social	 inequalities	 persist.	 Using	 the	 concept	 of	 Property	 Owning	
Democracy	 (POD)	 advanced	 by	 John	Rawls,	 this	 paper	 argues	 that	
an	asset-based	housing	policy	might	be	able	to	improve	social	justice	
and	reduce	poverty.	Using	Singapore’s	housing	system	as	an	example,	
this	paper	illustrates	the	connection	between	asset	building	and	POD,	
and	suggests	that	Singapore’s	housing	system,	to	some	extent,	fulfills	
the	requirements	of	Rawls’	theory	of	 justice	 in	terms	of	maintaining	
an	ex	ante	ownership	of	productive	resources	by	all	citizens	through	
a	 nation-wide	 public	 housing	 program	 that	 provides	 early	 access	 to	
state-produced	home	ownership.	The	result	is	comparatively	more	dis-
persed	property	ownership	and	wealth	 that	better	meets	 the	require-
ments	of	the	theory	of	justice.		
Keywords:	Rawlsian	property	 owning	democracy,	 asset-based	 social	
policy,	housing	policy,	social	investment
 Modern welfare states are challenged by two fundamental 
issues: first, notwithstanding continuous increases in social ex-
penditures, most welfare states have failed to adequately ad-
dress the problem of stagnating poverty and pervasive unem-
ployment; second, social policies have failed to ameliorate the 
106 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
issue of income inequalities and distributive justice. The gap 
between the haves and have-nots remains unprecedentedly 
wide in many advanced industrial economies, and consequent-
ly social injustice prevails in many corners of the world. Com-
plicating this scenario is another critical global issue—rampant 
housing price inflation and the pervasiveness of housing afford-
ability problems for low-income households, forcing many gov-
ernments to re-examine long-accepted premises underpinning 
their social housing policy. This paper intends to shed some 
light on the above scenario based on a number of observations 
emerging in the fields of housing policy, social investment and 
social philosophy. 
 First and foremost, in social philosophy, John Rawls has strong-
ly criticized the failure of contemporary welfare states in achieving 
social justice and proposed the idea of a Property Owning Democ-
racy (POD) with radically different social institutions in order to 
meet the requirements of his theory of justice (Rawls, 1971, 2001). 
He observes that worsening inequalities under welfare capitalism 
must be remedied by a wider dispersal of property ownership ex	
ante rather than ex	post. This means a distribution of some basic as-
sets to every citizen at a very early age so that they can invest them 
for a return, rather than provide them welfare at a later stage when 
they are experiencing difficulties.  
 Second, in recent years it has been observed that many west-
ern industrial economies have begun to restructure their social 
housing policies to those that seek to embrace asset-building 
and home ownership for the masses. The idea is that if hous-
ing assets appreciates in value over a family’s or an individual’s 
lifecycle, the wealth accumulated to some extent supplements/
enhances social welfare resources for the aged and in some cas-
es may even reduce inequalities. This development is interest-
ing in that it signals an important departure from a traditional 
social-rented housing policy to a tenure that emphasizes own-
er-occupation and asset-building. Finally, it has been observed 
that the social investment approach in social policy since the 
new millennium has encountered issues of focus and design, 
with initial results much less encouraging than was anticipated. 
 To effectively integrate social and economic policy, this pa-
per argues that social investment in housing assets is as import-
ant as investment in human assets, as the former helps to build 
the latter. In particular, the role and impact of housing policy in 
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social investment needs to be rigorously explored. Using Singa-
pore’s housing system as an example, this paper illustrates the 
connection between an asset-based housing policy and Raw-
ls’ POD. I argue that Singapore, to some extent, fulfills Rawls’ 
theory of justice in terms of maintaining an ex	ante ownership 
of productive resources through a nation-wide public housing 
program that ensures early ownership of assets. The result is 
comparatively more dispersed property ownership and a more 
rigorous fulfillment of the requirements of the theory of justice. 
The Problematic of Housing
Policy and Social Investment
 One key problem of contemporary housing policy lies in the 
absence of a coherent understanding of its role in social invest-
ment. Housing policy has often been seen as a “wobbly pillar” 
in the study of the welfare state, as it has a complex relation-
ship with the economy (Malpass, 2008; Ronald & Doling, 2010). 
Notwithstanding the long traditions of the two well-developed 
academic disciplines—housing studies and social policy—they 
remain strange bedfellows who seldom communicate. One pos-
sible explanation of this impasse points to the dual nature of 
housing both as consumption goods and capital investment. Its 
impact on GDP and its longevity as an asset often render its 
assessment beyond the scope of traditional social policy analy-
sis. It therefore remains difficult for policy researchers to clearly 
assess its role in welfare capitalism when compared to other key 
social policy pillars such as health and social welfare. 
 However, this state of affairs is increasingly unsustainable 
as global house prices went from peak to peak, pressurizing 
governments and policy researchers to find ways to tackle the 
housing question and to restructure social housing in a way that 
will not further burden the welfare state. Likewise, the wealth 
effect of home ownership, particularly among the fortunate 
middle class and the better-off working class households who 
enter the housing market at the right time, has prompted the 
question: is the idea of housing as asset-based welfare a viable 
alternative to replace conventional social housing policy? Sim-
ply put, if there is a potential wealth effect for homeowners that 
could result in a reduction in welfare expenditures, scarce so-
cial housing resources could be allocated to other more urgent 
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social needs. Some even go as far as to call for new attention 
to so-called “privatized Keynesianism,” where welfare attain-
ment is increasingly seen as lying within the private domain 
but with careful orchestration by the state through setting up a 
framework for the financialization of housing assets over one’s 
lifecycle (Van Gent, 2010).
 Concomitant with the idea of housing as a major tool of as-
set-based welfare is the increasing importance of social invest-
ment as a foundational direction of social policy in western indus-
trial societies. This is especially relevant in the European context; 
since the first decade of the new millennium was marked by an 
initial failure of the welfare state to meet social needs of the poor. 
Traditional social policy based on unilateral transfer and ame-
liorative welfare policies are no longer seen as viable solutions to 
meet social needs in an unstable global economy. 
 In 2013 the European Commission adopted a Social Invest-
ment Package that sets out a direction for an approach to social 
policy aiming both to facilitate economic growth and to protect 
people from poverty (Bouget, Frazer, Marlier, Sabato, & Van-
hercke, 2015). The core rationale is that welfare systems should 
fulfill three functions: social investment, social protection, and 
stabilization of the economy. The approach relies strongly on 
the key assumption of the social	 development	 approach that the 
right mix of social and economic policies should be mutually 
reinforcing, hence pointing towards a developmental view of 
welfare (Midgley, 2013). Theoretically, this new policy direction 
is highly relevant, but the real challenge lies in the mix and in-
tegration of various economic and social policies. Moreover, 
when framed in a social investment perspective, it represents 
a precondition for future economic and employment growth, 
gradually transforming a welfare state to a social investment 
state. In other words, social policies, in the right manner and 
combination, should have lasting impacts by offering economic 
and social returns over time (Bouget et al., 2015). 
 These were encouraging visions at the turn of the new 
millennium when the European Union was contemplating its 
long-term direction in social policy. What remains problematic, 
however, is that the initial results of social investment projects 
remain unsatisfactory. In particular, a number of EU studies 
(Cantillon, 2011; Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012; Vandenbroucke 
& Vleminckx, 2011) demonstrated that the transition from the 
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old distributive welfare state to a new social investment state is 
more difficult than expected. Poverty and unemployment still 
persist despite a highly targeted policy aiming at increasing 
social expenditures in the last decade (Cantillon, 2011). Some 
began to think that social investment was fast becoming policy 
rhetoric rather than a reality, when the EU budget disposed of 
only 1% of GDP on social investment (Nicaise & Schepers, 2013). 
The attainment of the 2020 EU target of lifting 20 million people 
out of poverty now seems more distant than ever. 
 Research findings have further suggested that the social in-
vestment paradigm may have shifted resources away from pro-
grams that are more distributive to programs that are less so, 
and that social investment might have contributed to a “re-com-
modification and retrenchment of unemployment benefits” 
(Vandenbroucke & Vleminckx, 2011, p. 451). These studies on 
large-scale national social investment efforts in Europe flagged 
one important blind spot of the social investment package. That 
is: while it is theoretically sound to integrate social and eco-
nomic policy, given the wide spectrum of policies, the relative/
differential effectiveness of various policy integrations have not 
been fully explored or understood. 
 There are two dimensions that need consideration. The first 
is time, as the results of some social investment policies take a 
much longer time span to realize. For example, social investment 
inputs in education take a very long time to realize and its so-
cio-economic effects might not lead to immediate employment. 
Factors such as chance or personal effort also play indispensable 
roles in turning social investment into real employment oppor-
tunities. Second, the nature/structure of a particular social policy 
might determine how well it could be integrated with economic 
goals. For example, a minimum income support program offers 
immediate social protection but might not be able to encourage 
work ethics and economic independence. On another level, struc-
tural issues in local economies may hinder the realization of inte-
gration given certain time-space constraints. 
 Moreover, a careful examination of the substantial contents 
of the Social Investment Package reveals one startling omis-
sion. Most policy instruments are heavily skewed towards the 
training and development of human assets, to the extent that 
physical assets or real assets have been neglected in the con-
ception of social investment. Given the premises that national 
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social policies in EU are about job creation and the reduction of 
dependence on social protection, the situation is self-explanato-
ry. However, research findings mentioned above have already 
suggested that employment demand is more often a function of 
global trends in production rather than a general rise in skilled 
labor supply (Sawyer, 2010). In any case, the nature of the social 
investment asset itself plays a significant role in determining 
the successful integration of social and economic policy. This 
then brings us to the issue of housing policy.
The Nature and Problem of Housing Policy
 Housing is essentially a physical asset, hence it is not con-
sidered a form of human asset or employment creation. How-
ever, if investment in housing assets gives rise to income and 
wealth, it then bears a relationship to enhanced life opportuni-
ties and capacities to weather family risks, quite similar to the 
effects of income from employment. If this is established, then 
the implication is that a social investment state should likewise 
embrace a policy on assisting households to build up housing 
assets. To appreciate the importance of this claim, we need to 
lay down some basic premises about the nature of housing.
 Housing bears two distinct characteristics. First, it is a com-
modity providing individuals with shelter as well as a stream 
of residential services over a very long time given its durability. 
This is called the “use value” of housing (Harvey, 1982). How-
ever, the fact that housing can be bought and sold like all oth-
er financial assets with changing market values makes it much 
more complex when compared to other social policies. This is 
called the “exchange value” of housing (Harvey, 1982). To illus-
trate, if government provides residential care services for the 
mentally ill, it is a form of welfare expenditure and consump-
tion, and hence not so much a form of social investment. But 
then, if the government builds and sells low-cost condomini-
ums to low-income families, then other than the consumption 
of residential services, housing price appreciations are a tan-
gible outcome of asset investment that provides families with 
accumulated wealth for future use. 
 Theoretically, the increasing isolation of the exchange-value 
from use-value, not just in housing exchange, but in all kinds of 
commodity exchanges, highlights one fundamental contradiction 
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of modern capitalism (Harvey, 2012; Mises, 1933/1978).  Such iso-
lation encourages exponential extractions of capital gains from 
housing exchange that partly explain the phenomenon of ram-
pant house price inflations in major housing markets such as 
San Francisco, Hong Kong and New York. In housing economics, 
these two values serve two important economic functions: first, 
the provision of shelter for families satisfies a	demand	 for	 space; 
second, the exchange value satisfies a	demand	for	asset	investment	
(DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1996). When people own their house, it 
is natural for them to embrace both values. The importance is the 
relative weight people attach to each value. 
 It has been suggested that when households put greater em-
phasis on the exchange-value, the housing market tends to be 
more speculative and fluctuates more; this makes house prices 
less stable as homeowners move more often to realize capital 
gains or to adjust their housing investment portfolio, either up-
scaling or downsizing (Forrest & Lee, 2004). This situation is 
typically found in major housing markets around the world. 
Alternatively, if homeowners place greater importance on the 
use-value, the housing market tends to be more stable, as people 
tend to move less often and the market is less prone to specu-
lative activities (Ball, 2002; Harvey, 2013). This situation is typ-
ically found in housing markets such as Germany, Switzerland 
and Finland. These markets are characterized by more mature 
homeowners and relatively stable house prices (Diwilde & Ron-
ald, 2017; Forrest & Lee, 2003). However, even Nordic welfare 
states or corporatist Germany are now becoming vulnerable to 
the globalization of housing speculations, with parts of their ur-
ban housing markets also showing signs of instability (Emanu-
elsson, 2015).  
 Given this investment nature of housing, the key issue is thus 
about how the returns on housing investment could form part 
of the social investment package, to the extent of counteracting 
the monopolization of capital gains by big capital by dispersing 
gains amongst the less well-off. However, before considering 
how an appropriate institution could be set up to reap the social 
investment benefits of housing, there is another justification why 
the state has a stronger role to play in the housing system. This 
is about the inflationary trend of global housing markets and the 
high concentration of property wealth among a small sector of 
the population within most advanced industrial economies.
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 Housing researchers have long observed the inflationary 
trends of housing markets in major cities around the world (Ball, 
2002). Two reasons could be adduced: the first is about specula-
tive international investors looking for investment opportuni-
ties around major global cities. According to the 2016 Economist 
House Price Indicator, the global housing market continued to 
rise unabatedly, with Hong Kong, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand leading the pack in 2016 (The Economist, 2017). Foreign 
investors, particularly those from China, have fueled the global 
housing markets. Since autumn 2014, an estimate of $1.3 trillion 
of capital has flowed out of China, and some of that cash has 
found its way into the residential property market in some of 
the world’s most congested cities (The Economist, 2017). In addi-
tion, according to the 2017 International Housing Affordability 
Survey, Hong Kong is found to be the world’s least affordable 
housing market alongside with places like Sydney, Vancouver, 
and Auckland, with the Least Affordable Housing Index of 18.1 
(Demographia International, 2017).  
 The second reason for the inflationary trends in housing 
markets concerns institutional barriers, such as land-use reg-
ulations to prevent adequate supply of land for housing. One 
important reason advanced to explain housing price inflation 
in the San Francisco Bay Area and Hong Kong has been con-
cerned with land use regulations in force in these two places 
that effectively prevent the release of land for development 
(Demographia International, 2017). Donald Brash, a long time 
governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, stated, “the af-
fordability of housing is overwhelmingly a function of just one 
thing—the extent to which government places artificial restric-
tions on the supply of residential land” (Betraud, 2014, p. 8). 
Given these institutional barriers and speculative investment 
capital, economists have long suggested that it is quite impos-
sible for government regulations to halt house price inflations 
(Bosch-Badia, Montllor-Serrats, Panosa-Gubau, & Tarrazon-Ro-
don, 2014).  Administrative measures, such as the increase of 
property tax or transaction tax, are frequently used as cool-
ing-off measures for overheated real estate markets. However, 
the long-term effectiveness of such price regulation measures 
is often hampered when “hot money” floods into the real estate 
market again. 
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 The high concentration of property wealth within a small 
sector of the population that gives rise to a much higher income 
inequality is yet another aspect that justifies stronger state in-
tervention in more dispersed property ownership, particularly 
for housing. Thomas Picketty’s most celebrated economic study 
in 2013 suggests that capital or wealth ownership is much more 
concentrated than the distribution of income from work. His 
data for the U.S. indicates that the top decile own 72% of Amer-
ica’s wealth while the bottom half’s claim is just 2% (Picketty, 
2014). In other words, the rate of return on capital is greater than 
the rate of economic growth; the result is thus an overconcen-
tration of wealth amongst the rich. Henceforth, one possible 
measure to ensure adequate supply of affordable housing for 
low-income groups is through a proactive housing policy in as-
sisted home ownership so as to disperse property ownership at 
an early stage.
Property Owning Democracy and Housing Policy
 Although state intervention in the housing market through 
social housing is generally justified on the basis of market fail-
ures, social philosophy broke new ground on such policy ratio-
nale in the last decade. This is based primarily on the work of 
John Rawls, as he was unhappy with the pervasiveness of social 
inequalities amongst modern welfare states. Re-examining his 
theory of justice at the beginning of this millennium, he made 
one important observation: the continued high concentration of 
productive resources by big capital remains problematic with 
achieving the social conditions essential for a just society (Raw-
ls, 1971, 2001). His defence of POD against welfare state capi-
talism in Justice	as	Fairness:	A	Restatement	(2001) has revitalized 
discussions over the merits of an asset-based approach to social 
policy, as opposed to the income-based approach, which was 
raised by Michael Sherraden decades ago under the aegis of 
welfare policy reform (Sherraden, 1991; Sherraden, Nair, Vasoo, 
Liang, & Sherraden, 1995). 
 Rawlsian POD concurs with Sherraden’s asset-based ap-
proach in that an income-based approach to welfare fails to bring 
about social justice. Instead of relying solely on transfer pay-
ments ex	post to those who fall below certain social minimum, it 
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is paramount to make sure that there is a more equitable distri-
bution of initial holdings ex	ante so that everyone can start with 
some assets. While an income-based approach seeks to provide 
a decent minimum standard of living below which no citizens 
should fall, an asset-based approach is about making sure that 
“all citizens have tangible property, and enough of it to mate-
rially affect their life prospects and possibilities for exercising 
personal liberty” (Williamson, 2012, p. 226). Rawls’ position is 
best summarized in the following quotation:
The background institutions of property-owning democracy 
work to disperse the ownership of wealth and capital, and 
thus to prevent a small part of society from controlling the 
economy, and indirectly, political life as well. By contrast, 
welfare-state capitalism permits a small class to have a near 
monopoly of the means of production. Property-owning de-
mocracy avoids this, not by the redistribution of income to 
those with less at the end of each period, so to speak, but 
rather by ensuring the widespread ownership of production 
assets and human capital at the beginning of each period, all 
this against a background of fair equality of opportunity. The 
intent is not simply to assist those who lose out through acci-
dent or misfortune, but rather to put all citizens in a position 
to manage their own affairs on footing of a suitable degree of 
social and economic equality. (Rawls, 2001, p. 139)
In short, a Rawlsian POD calls for an allocation of a certain 
amount of tangible property to every citizen and places restric-
tions on the accumulation of wealth and capital, contending 
that these two measures can help bringing an end to domina-
tion in politics. 
 The key is thus about the timing of social policy. Resources 
provided when an individual or the family faces difficulties are 
considered consumption rather than investment. For instance, pro-
viding access to the right education for young people early in their 
lives is far better than retraining them when they lose their work. 
In other words, to what extent a country can be fully or partially 
described as Rawlsian POD can be judged by three criteria: (i) Are 
there redistributive programs aiming at giving every citizen 
some tangible property to begin early in life, or even at birth? 
(ii) Are there legal and institutional arrangements serving as 
restrictions on accumulation of wealth and inter-generational 
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transfer of property? (iii) Are citizens able to enjoy fair value of 
their political liberties as a result of a more equitable distribu-
tion of property ownership? 
 My general argument is that assets distributed through the 
housing system provide individuals and families with import-
ant financial assets supplemental to educational or skills assets, 
as proposed in the social investment package. A house owned 
and occupied by the owner represents a stake in the country 
and thus provides lifelong services such as shelter and onto-
logical security (Saunders, 1990). However, the most important 
aspect of assisted home ownership through social housing pro-
grams is about providing the poor a foundation asset with the 
potential to appreciate over a lifetime, similar to what capital 
investment is about for major capital owners and firms. A high 
percentage of home ownership, to the extent of 80% or above, ac-
tually represents a society with comparatively more dispersed 
property ownership, when compared to one having say, 50% 
home ownership.
The Case of Singapore:
Asia’s First Property Owning Democracy?
 Although Singapore is one of the richest countries in Asia, 
it is not considered the most equal. With successive econom-
ic deregulations since the last decade, some homeowners have 
used their capital gains from housing to invest in the small but 
speculative private housing market and made windfall gains. 
Coupled with other liberalizing economic policy, there are 
signs that social inequality is worsening. Nonetheless, with a 
Gini Coefficient of 0.458 in 2016, the lowest in a decade, Singa-
pore still compared favorably with places like New York, Lon-
don and Hong Kong, where Gini-coefficients are much worse 
(Singapore Department of Statistics, 2016). Moreover, from zero 
share of housing wealth in 1965, households’ share of gross 
housing wealth exceeded 60% during the Asian financial crisis. 
Despite the volatility of asset prices, by 2005, 85% of individuals 
and families residing in public housing enjoyed a share of about 
50% of the gross housing wealth, providing clear evidence 
to justify the value of an early asset-building housing policy 
(Phang, 2001, 2015a, 2015b).
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 Given this housing wealth background, three distinct fea-
tures make the Singapore housing system vastly different from 
most other housing systems in the world. With a home owner-
ship rate of 90.9% in 2016, Singapore is the first country in the 
world with a housing policy aiming at 100% home ownership 
for the masses. This is the first distinct feature. There are two 
important underlying values: (a) home ownership is considered 
good for all as it provides every family with a stake in the coun-
try; (b) home ownership should help households to build up 
assets and wealth, thus enabling citizens to share the fruits of 
economic growth. This is evident from Lee Kuan Yew’s import-
ant memoir From	3rd	World	to	First: 
My primary preoccupation was to give every citizen a stake in 
the country and its future. I wanted a home-owning society. 
I had seen the contrast between the blocks of low-cost rent-
al flats, badly misused and poorly maintained, and those of 
house-proud owners, and was convinced that if every family 
owned its home, the country would be more stable…my other 
important motive was to give all parents whose sons would 
have to do national service a stake…If soldiers’ families did 
not own their home, he would soon conclude he would be 
fighting to protect the properties of the wealthy. (Lee Kuan 
Yew, 2000, pp. 95–96)
 In the middle of the twentieth century, Singapore was noth-
ing more than a small tropical city with unpleasantly high 
humidity, abundant marshland, and a population mostly of 
Chinese descent; but by 1980, Singapore has already emerged 
to become one of the most important new economic powers in 
East Asia, with a per capita GDP of U.S. $6865 and a population 
of 2.4 million. In 2017, Singapore’s per capita GDP is estimated 
at $51,431, with a population of 5.6 million. An important chal-
lenge for the developmental state is for the capacity of the gov-
ernment to respond to changing circumstances in the context of 
an increasingly competitive global market. This then brings up 
the second distinct feature of Singapore’s housing system.
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Asset-building through Home Ownership for All
 To attract international capital, the Singapore government 
faces one major challenge: to build a multi-racial workforce 
that is productivity-enhancing, supported by families who find 
life secure. How could this be achieved? To do so, the society 
needs a social security system that encourages individuals and 
families to save for the future and a shelter that provides them 
security and decency. This means social planning for a secure 
lifelong income stream through savings and asset-building. The 
government reckoned that this could only be done primarily 
through a collective saving institution that could create the nec-
essary capitalization for housing investment—that is the Cen-
tral Provident Fund (CPF). The idea is that with CPF building 
up compulsory savings for all households, savings are then 
channeled for capital formation at the macro level, where the 
government invests them in owner-occupier housing built by 
the state. This housing is then sold to CPF members, who pay 
their mortgages provided by the housing authority out of their 
CPF savings. This process creates a circuit of capital going from 
the people to the state and back to the people. 
 The interesting thing to note is that the Housing Develop-
ment Board (HDB) actually provides loans and mortgages to 
Singaporeans and hence successfully marginalized commercial 
banking activities. The monopolization of the mortgage business 
by the state is further sealed by fixing the mortgage lending rate 
at 0.1% higher than the interest rate provided by CPF for house-
hold savings, thus ensuring affordability in loan repayment. 
 We then come to the third distinct characteristic—monopoly 
in housing production and housing finance. To ensure that Sin-
gaporeans develop confidence in their housing wealth, one needs 
to establish a mature and stable housing market and a highly reg-
ulative housing finance system, one that ensures relatively stable 
house prices over the long-run and with the least price specula-
tions. To achieve this, the government needs to take advantage 
of some kind of monopolistic position. To do so, first the Singa-
pore government joins up the CPF and the HDB. This means a 
monopoly of: (a) housing production; and (b) the mortgage mar-
ket. In other words, Singapore’s largest developer is the HDB 
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and the largest mortgage bank is also the HDB. Mortgages from 
commercial banks only apply to a tiny sector of the housing mar-
ket existing outside the public system and hence, unlike the rest 
of the world, price movements in the private housing sector exert 
little influence on overall house prices. To mitigate speculative 
activities, the Singapore housing market is closed, where only 
citizens could buy or sell public flats with, of course, quite a few 
restrictive rules. In addition, with carefully built-in adjustment 
mechanisms for the CPF contribution rates for employers and em-
ployees, the consequence is a relatively stable price regime. When 
the economy is overheated, CPF contribution rate for both house-
holds and employers will increase, whereas during an economic 
downturn, the lowering of the contribution rate helps boost con-
sumption and reduce labor costs. More important, prices for new 
government flats are fixed in accordance with prevailing income 
data to ensure affordability. Without these monopolistic control 
mechanisms, house prices would fluctuate enormously, like the 
rest of the world.
 An interesting comparison is to contrast Singapore’s hous-
ing system with that of Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the housing 
system is quite independent of the social security system. Al-
though the housing authority produces and distributes some 
50% of housing in both rental and owner-occupier housing, the 
government lacks any adequate capacity or monopolistic mech-
anisms to stabilize house prices. Instead, in the last four decades 
the housing market was monopolized to a great extent by a few 
large real estate developers, whose concerns were apparently 
profit maximization (Lee, 1999). House prices have always been 
subjected to great fluctuations as a result of intense specula-
tive activities, not just from global corporate investors, but also 
from small homeowners who see home-buying as a channel for 
quick gains (Smart & Lee, 2003). Henceforth, only a small part 
of the middle class households managed to accumulate assets 
and were highly dependent on the time of their exit and entry 
to the housing market (Forrest & Lee, 2004). Unfortunately, to-
day many middle class households still cannot afford private 
housing as a result of long-term house price inflations. The gov-
ernment barely plays a role in pursuing a social policy based on 
asset-building, resulting in a constant battle with the political 
left about building more public housing to ease housing short-
ages. A tour around Hong Kong’s new condominium districts 
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is self-explanatory. While there is an acute housing shortage, 
there are at the same time many vacant flats being hoarded by 
housing investors big and small! This is exactly why John Rawls 
was so depressed by welfare state performances and why he 
considers it paramount to provide tangible assets ex	ante rather 
than ex	post. 
Justice as Fairness:
The Genesis of a Just Housing Policy
 If one reason for the success of Singapore housing lies in 
its integration of the social security system with housing, then 
what is the underlying purpose of such institutional arrange-
ment? For Singapore, the beginning of one such institutional 
arrangement was accidental and closely linked to an establish-
ment of a primitive saving scheme run by the British colonial 
government in 1950s (Lowe, 2001). CPF essentially began as a 
self-funded savings scheme to help local government servants 
who were excluded from civil service benefits of British colo-
nial officials. It was modeled after African and Malaysian sys-
tems in order to ensure that the British government was not 
unduly burdened by social security expenditures of its colo-
nies. However, as it developed, the Singapore Provident Fund 
scheme turned out to be an extremely valuable legacy for the 
new government. From the outset, the emphasis of the CPF 
scheme was on provisions for old age. Despite pressure from 
workers calling for changes to enable them to flexibly withdraw 
their savings, the government stood firm on the rule that sav-
ings could only be withdrawn upon retirement at 58. It was not 
until the late 1960s that the CPF rule was liberalized to include 
home purchase from the housing authority with CPF savings. 
Since then, it has been slowly adapting to the changing needs of 
an increasingly affluent population. Singaporeans can now use 
their CPF savings for various purposes, including stocks invest-
ments, health-care insurance and overseas college education 
for children from the aspiring middle class. In 2016, the Total 
Contribution Rate for CPF was 37% of wage, with 17% from the 
employer and 20% from the employee. The involvement of the 
state in facilitating the management of an individual’s lifelong 
wealth portfolio through home ownership is perhaps the key 
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characteristics of the Singaporean social policy model. Amidst 
emotive labels such as “the nanny state” or “Singapore Incorpo-
rated,” is, in fact, a radically different social policy approach—
one that goes beyond meeting housing needs by helping house-
holds to accumulate lifelong assets and attain security through 
home ownership. 
 While many welfare states in the West have generally done 
well to provide the material base of the welfare state, they do 
not guarantee that the needs of all social groups are well met, 
particularly those from the low income groups and the socially 
deprived. The virtues of welfare capitalism in the form of pri-
vate property ownership, free enterprises, and open competi-
tion can have very bad side effects. The downside is greed and 
selfishness when profit motivation is taken to its extreme. Al-
though Rawls attached a much broader meaning to the idea of 
property in POD, embracing both human and physical assets, 
the extremities of market imperfections are demonstrated much 
more vividly in the housing market. Henceforth, to enable a 
housing system that works for the masses, one must establish 
such a system at an early stage. To do so, Singapore set out strict 
laws and regulations on land use and transactions in the early 
1970s, not to make allowance for windfall gains by private de-
velopers on land acquisition. This is evident in the following 
statement from Lee Kuan Yew’s memoir:
I further amended the law to give the government power to 
acquire land for public purposes at its value on a date then 
fixed at 30 November 1973. I saw no reason why private land-
owners should profit from an increase in land value brought 
about by economic development and the infrastructure paid 
for with public funds. (Lee Kuan Yew, 2000, p. 97)
 This is an absolutely unimaginable public policy position in 
a free market economy like North America or Hong Kong, since 
it not only empowers the state to monopolize land use, but also 
forestalls private gains on land. However, if seen from the POD 
perspective, this represents an early institutional arrangement 
to shift land resources allocation to mass home ownership in 
order to achieve fairness and justice in its use, something that 
requires careful crafting in terms of social planning from the 
very beginning.
121Chapter TitleSingapore Housing Policy
 A distinction needs to be made between the productive as-
pect of capitalism and its distributive aspect. Very often, cap-
italism results in a distribution that is neither desirable nor 
sustainable. The private motivation of buyers and sellers, each 
maximizing utility and profits, could generate behavior that is 
counterproductive to class interests. It is here where the politics 
of governance prevails, laying down the foundation of modern 
welfare capitalism - the state having a role to play as the umpire 
to maintain a pattern of distribution that could induce “just” 
class interests. The ultimate aim is to achieve a fair and just so-
ciety where individual differences and motivations can be pro-
tected, while not resulting in favoring only a few big winners. 
 Embedded in Singapore’s social policy is a clear claim for 
social justice. Lee Kuan Yew (2000) considers that there is noth-
ing wrong with socialism or the welfare state. What is problem-
atic concerns getting the institutional arrangements right. The 
following statement in his first memoir is highly reflective of his 
systematic attempt to establish social justice in social policy. “A 
Fair, not Welfare Society,” the title of Chapter Seven of his first 
memoir, clearly states his ultimate aim: 
We believed in socialism, in fair shares for all. Later we learnt 
that personal motivation and personal rewards were essen-
tial for a productive economy. However, because people are 
unequal in their abilities, if performance and rewards are 
determined by the market place, there will be a few big win-
ners, many medium winners, a considerable number of los-
ers. That would make for social tensions because a society’s 
sense of fairness is offended. (Lee Kuan Yew, 2000, p. 95)  
 It is interesting to note Lee’s comparison of Singapore to 
Hong Kong. The following statement again reflects Singapore’s 
attempt to balance the adverse effects of growth and the role of 
the state: 
A competitive winner-takes-all society, like colonial Hong 
Kong in the 1960s, would not be acceptable in Singapore. A 
colonial government did not have to face elections every 5 
years, the Singapore government did. To even out the ex-
treme results of free-market competition, we had to redistrib-
ute the earning power of citizens, such as education. Housing 
and public health were also obviously desirable. But finding 
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the correct solution for medical care, pensions, or retirement 
benefits was not easy…We decided each matter in a pragmatic 
way, always mindful of possible abuse and waste…Our dif-
ficulty was to strike the right balance. (Lee Kuan Yew, 2000, 
p. 95) 
 Given this background, three primary connections between 
housing and social policy in Singapore are clear. First, for a so-
cial policy to be sustainable in the long-run, it has to uphold 
the principle of justice, particularly for the not-so-competitive. 
Second, there has to be an institutional arrangement that does 
not work against individual incentives. Third, because of the 
unique nature of housing both as investment and consumption 
goods, its vulnerability in the open market, and its asset-build-
ing nature, the housing system tends to work more equitably 
in a collective manner, and must be divorced from pure profit 
maximization. To achieve this, the society must make an early 
choice between the market or the state regarding housing. This 
again begs an interesting comparison between Hong Kong and 
Singapore that reflects their fundamental differences in gover-
nance. While both places belong to what Schwartz & Seabrooke 
(2008) coined “residential capitalism,” where housing and the 
real estate sector play central roles in their economy, as a re-
sult of very different institutional arrangements, Singapore 
enjoys the status as one of the best-housed countries with an 
abundant supply of affordable housing, while Hong Kong con-
stantly suffered from spiraling house prices and affordability 
problems over the last three decades. Both places, interestingly, 
exhibit a high degree of state intervention in public housing: 
Hong Kong 53%; Singapore 90%. As rightly argued by Schwartz 
& Seabrooke (2008), housing policy is a prime causal factor for 
domestic and international economic and political outcomes. 
 In the last three decades, the lack of effective regulation in 
the Hong Kong housing market and the constant housing price 
inflation has spurred great political tensions between political 
parties representing popular interests and real estate interests. 
“Real estate imperialism” and “government-business collusion” 
have been two strong allegations confronting the Hong Kong 
political agenda. An unjust society has been developed along 
the fault-line between those who own and those who could not. 
Politically, however, this scenario does not apply to Singapore. 
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Why? My previous discussions all point to the conscious for-
mation of institutional arrangements in housing policy by the 
state, based on a clear social philosophy of fairness and justice. 
I think this is by far the most neglected and the least studied 
aspect of Singapore’s social policy.
Analysis
 When John Rawls deliberated the idea of POD in Justice	
as	Fairness:	A	Restatement, Singapore’s housing system had al-
ready been in operation for thirty-seven years. It was unlikely 
Lee Kuan Yew had consulted his idea when the home owner-
ship program was launched in 1964. In those days, Singapore’s 
housing was all about political legitimacy (Chua, 1997). After 
her bitter separation from Malaysia, Singapore badly needed a 
stable work force for economic development. A stake holding 
approach to housing seems a logical choice for nation-building. 
Later, when the economy grew in the late 1970s, it also met with 
a corresponding increase in housing prices, and hence the first 
feeling of wealth by homeowners. There were pressures on the 
government to reduce CPF contributions so that there could be 
more take-home pay for consumption. The government then re-
alized an important public choice had to be made: should it fo-
cus on present or future consumption? My previous quotations 
from Lee Kuan Yew have already explained Singapore’s choice.
 To conclude, I return to the three POD criteria mentioned at 
the beginning of this paper to see if Singapore fits well: (i) Are 
there redistributive programs aiming at giving every citizen 
some tangible property to begin with? The answer is obvious-
ly yes. The CPF cum housing program clearly demonstrates its 
positive effects in terms of an improved dispersal of property 
ownership through housing at an early stage. This paper does 
not address the education and health care programs in Singa-
pore, however, they also fit well in the asset-building schema 
and are very much reflective of the spirit espoused in POD. (ii) 
Are there legal and institutional arrangements serving as re-
strictions on over accumulation of wealth and inter-generational 
transfer of property? This is the not-so-successful part of Singa-
pore’s plan. Economic liberalization has expanded in successive 
governments, and to strengthen political legitimacy, the gov-
ernment has allowed some to prosper more than the others. 
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This engenders widening inequalities and likewise reflects a 
lack of insitutional establishment to restrain accumulations. (iii) 
Are citizens able to enjoy a fair value of their political liberties 
as a result of a more equitable distribution of property owner-
ship? This is a more controversial part of the equation that de-
serves a rigorous discussion going beyond this paper. However, 
Singapore is a limited democracy with universal suffrage. The 
People’s Action Party (PAP) has won every election since 1959. 
The dominance of the PAP, a low level of press freedom and 
restrictions on civil liberties and political rights have led many 
to classify Singapore as a semi-authoritarian regime.  In this 
respect I am inclined to adopt a	process	approach to answer the 
third question. I believe Rawls has made an important point in 
justice as fairness and the primacy of political rights. The pres-
ent political system in Singapore clearly does not measure up 
to the requirements of the fair value of equal political liberties. 
However, if the structure of social policy is based on a genuine 
fairness for its citizens in a POD sense, citizens will be empow-
ered politically as a result of widely dispersed property owner-
ship, hence providing Singapore the best potential to develop as 
Asia’s first POD. 
 Finally, notwithstanding the fact that Singapore does not ful-
ly meet with the three POD criteria, its housing system does serve 
as a distinct model for social investment. In fact it fully meets the 
three objectives of EU’s Social Investment Package: social invest-
ment, social protection, and stabilization of the economy. Many 
researchers have agreed that without the housing system, Sin-
gapore would be a very different place today (Castells, Goh, & 
Kwok, 1991; Chua, 1997; Doling & Ronald, 2010, 2014; Forrest & 
Lee, 2003, 2004; Lowe, 2001). Indeed, its unique approach to social 
investment through housing deserves a much more rigorous ex-
amination in both theory and practice.
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